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Class Actions
by Thomas M. Byrne *
and Stacey McGavin Mohr **
A major decision outlawing “incentive” or “service” awards to named
class representatives in settlements highlighted the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s class-action work during 2020. The
court became the first court to prohibit such awards, disrupting
settlement negotiations across the circuit—if not elsewhere—while
challenging courts and litigants to identify the precise scope of the new
doctrine. In other cases this year, the court tackled issues related to class
settlements, standing, and exceptions to Class Action Fairness Act
(CAFA) jurisdiction, and decided what looks to be the beginning of the
end of the Florida tobacco-litigation appeals that have come to be known
as the “Engle progeny.”
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I. INCENTIVE AWARDS AND OTHER CLASS-SETTLEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
A. Class Representative Incentive Awards: Johnson v. NPAS
In Johnson v. NPAS Solutions, LLC,1 the Eleventh Circuit held that
federal law prohibits so-called “incentive payments” to class
representatives, even as part of an agreed settlement. The court
acknowledged that it was forging a new path, identifying errors that it
said “ha[d] become commonplace in everyday class-action practice” and
noting that the district court had “handled the class-action settlement
here in pretty much exactly the same way that hundreds of courts before
it have handled similar settlements.”2 But the Eleventh Circuit
nevertheless held that the district court had “ignored on-point Supreme
Court precedent prohibiting such awards” when it approved a settlement
that included a $6,000 incentive payment to the lead plaintiff.3
Johnson was a class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act (TCPA).4 The named plaintiff alleged that the defendant (a debt
collector) had unlawfully used an automatic telephone-dialing system to
call his cell phone without his consent. The case was certified for
settlement purposes, and the district court approved the settlement over
the objections of a single class member. Among other things, the class
member objected to the setting of the objection deadline before the
deadline for class counsel to file their fee petition and the $6,000
incentive to be paid to the class representative.5
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the settlement on appeal.6 First, the
court concluded that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure “23(h)’s plain
language requires a district court to sequence filings such that class
counsel file and serve their attorneys’-fee motion before any objection
pertaining to fees is due.”7 Setting an objection deadline after the class
notice goes out, but before the fee petition itself has been filed, is
insufficient to give potential objectors full information and ensure that
the fee petition “has been tested by the adversarial process.”8 That said,

1 975 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2020). The court’s opinion was authored by Judge Kevin
Newsom.
2 Id. at 1248–49.
3 Id. at 1248.
4 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2021).
5 Johnson, 975 F.3d at 1249–50.
6 Id. at 1263.
7 Id. at 1252.
8 Id.
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the court concluded that the specific error in that regard was harmless
on the record.9
As for the $6,000 incentive award, the court looked to Supreme Court
precedent dating back to the nineteenth century on paying attorneys’ fees
from a “common fund.”10 Under that authority, “[a] plaintiff suing on
behalf of a class can be reimbursed for attorneys’ fees and expenses
incurred in carrying on the litigation, but he cannot be paid a salary or
be reimbursed for his personal expenses.”11 The Eleventh Circuit
reasoned that “modern-day incentive awards present even more
pronounced risks” because they “are intended not only to compensate
class representatives for their time ([namely,] as a salary), but also to
promote litigation by providing a prize to be won ([that is,] as a bounty).”12
Nor could the court “see why paying an incentive award isn’t tantamount
to giving a ‘preferred position’ to a class representative ‘simply by reason
of his status’”—in violation of the general principle that named plaintiffs
who choose to sue on behalf of a class “‘disclaim[] any right to a preferred
position in the settlement’” of their claims.13
The court was similarly unimpressed by the observation that incentive
awards are “routine:” “[S]o far as we can tell, that state of affairs is a
product of inertia and inattention, not adherence to law . . . . Needless to
say, we are not at liberty to sanction a device or practice, however
widespread, that is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent.”14
Judge Beverly Martin authored a separate opinion dissenting in part,
“disagree[ing] with the majority’s decision to take away the incentive
award,” and noting “the practical effect of requiring named plaintiffs to
incur costs well beyond any benefits they receive from their role in
leading the class.”15 Instead, Judge Martin would have adhered to the
“fairness analysis” undertaken by other courts to determine whether a
lead plaintiff’s incentive award is fair to the class as a whole.16 Judge
Martin also expressed concern that the panel majority had departed from
the Eleventh Circuit’s prior precedent and “take[n] our court out of the
mainstream.”17
Id. at 1255.
TRS. v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 529 (1881); Cent. R.R. & Banking Co. of Ga. v.
Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885).
11 Johnson, 975 F.3d at 1257.
12 Id. at 1258.
13 Id. at 1258–59 (quoting Kincade v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 506 (5th
Cir. 1981)).
14 Id. at 1259–60.
15 Id. at 1264 (Martin, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 1267–68.
17 Id. at 1268.
9

10
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The Johnson panel opinions, however, may not be the end of the
matter. The named plaintiff and the objector both filed petitions for
rehearing en banc, with the plaintiff arguing that the majority’s opinion
“effects a sea change in class-action practice” and “opens a conflict with
every other circuit.”18 In addition, the plaintiff’s petition has been
supported by six separate amicus briefs, submitted on behalf of over forty
legal and advocacy organizations and individuals, including the current
author of Newberg on Class Actions,19 the treatise cited in the Johnson
majority opinion.20
Meanwhile, district courts have struggled with Johnson’s implications
for approval of class settlements, including many that were negotiated
and filed before the opinion was published. Some courts have disallowed
such awards before final approval of the settlement.21 In other cases,
courts have distinguished Johnson and allowed payments, on the basis
that the class claim arose under state law,22 for example, or that the
payment was not really an incentive award.23 In what seems the most
pragmatic approach, courts have deferred ruling on requested incentive
awards, approving other aspects of the settlement but retaining
jurisdiction to consider that issue pending the outcome of Johnson.24

18 Pl.-Appellee Charles T. Johnson’s Pet. for Reh’g En Banc, at 5, 8, filed Oct. 22, 2020,
No. 18-12344 (11th Cir.). The objector, for her part, sought rehearing as to the portion of
the decision regarding attorneys’ fees, urging the Eleventh Circuit to require common-fund
awards of attorneys’ fees to be calculated either on a lodestar basis (limited to actual
billings) or as a more “modest” 5% to 10% of the common fund. Appellant Jenna’s
Dickenson’s Pet. for Reh’g or for Reh’g En Banc, at 1, filed Oct. 22, 2020, No. 18-12344 (11th
Cir.).
19 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions (5th ed. 2011).
20 Order, filed Nov. 5, 2020, No. 18-12344 (11th Cir.) (granting motions for leave to file
amicus briefs).
21 Drazen v. GoDaddy.com, LLC, No. 1:19-cv-00563-KD-B, 2020 WL 8254868, at *14
(S.D. Ala. Dec. 23, 2020) (denying approval of requested service award of $5,000 per lead
plaintiff on settlement of TCPA claims); Jairam v. Colourpop Cosmetics, LLC, No.
0:19-cv-62438-RAR, 2020 WL 5848620, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2020) (same); Smith v.
KFORCE Inc., No. 8:19-cv-02068-CEH-CPT, 2020 WL 7250603, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 9,
2020) (preliminarily approving settlement without service award); Kuhr v. Mayo Clinic
Jacksonville, No. 3:19-cv-453-J-34MCR, 2020 WL 5912350, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2020)
(same).
22 Roth v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., No. 0:16-cv-62942-WPD, slip. op. at 29, ¶ 67 (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 8, 2021).
23 Miller v. Creative Hairdressers, Inc., No. 8:20-cv-00912-CEH-TGW, 2021 WL 231347,
at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 2021) (payment to representative plaintiff “was not an incentive
award, but compensation for her distinct claim for two weeks’ of unpaid PTO”), report and
recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 229607, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2021).
24 See e.g., Mosley v. Lozano Ins. Adjusters, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-00379-TJC-JRK, 2021 WL
289031, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2021); Metzler v. Medical Mgmt. Int’l, No.
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B. Counsel’s Duties to the Class Representative and the Class:
Oppenheim
In another decision involving a TCPA class settlement, Medical &
Chiropractic Clinic, Inc. v. Oppenheim,25 the Eleventh Circuit held that
counsel for a proposed class does not owe the named class representatives
a heightened fiduciary duty relative to other class members. This
decision marked the court’s return to an unseemly and protracted
controversy stemming from TCPA claims against the Tampa Bay
Buccaneers.26 In the earlier case, Technology Training Associates v.
Buccaneers Ltd. Partnership,27 the court had reversed a district court’s
decision not to allow a class member to intervene in a class action in
which a settlement had been proposed.
Tech Training and Oppenheim both arose from a struggle between
competing would-be class counsel over a $20 million settlement with the
Buccaneers. Before either case was filed, there had been another putative
class action bringing TCPA claims against the Buccaneers, in which the
parties (including plaintiff Medical & Chiropractic Clinic) had reached
an impasse in mediated settlement negotiations. One of the plaintiffs’
lawyers (Mr. Oppenheim) then left for another firm, and that firm soon
filed another putative class action raising the same TCPA claims against
the Buccaneers, this time with Tech Training as the named plaintiff.
Within two months, a settlement was reached and preliminarily
approved by the court in the Tech Training case. The ensuing appeal
permitted Medical & Chiropractic Clinic, represented by Oppenheim’s
now-rival counsel, to intervene and object to the settlement.28 On

8:19-cv-02289-VMC-CPT, 2020 WL 5994537, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 9, 2020); see also
Fruitstone v. Spartan Race Inc., No. 1:20-cv-20836-BB, 2021 WL 354189, at *7 (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 2, 2021) (granting preliminary approval for purposes of class notice but noting that
jurisdiction would be retained as to the issue at the time of final approval); Harvey v.
Hammel & Kaplan Co., No. 3:19-cv-00640-TJC-JRK, 2020 WL 7138568, at *3 (M.D. Fla.
Dec. 7, 2020) (same); Brockman v. Mankin Law Grp., P.A., No. 8:20-cv-00893-MSS-JSS,
2020 WL 6106890, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2020) (granting preliminary approval but noting
that the parties “shall be prepared to discuss at the final fairness hearing the propriety of
the $2,000 award to Plaintiff in light of” Johnson).
25 981 F.3d 983 (11th Cir. 2020). The court’s opinion was authored by Judge R. David
Proctor, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Alabama, sitting by
designation.
26 Id. at 986.
27 874 F.3d 692 (11th Cir. 2017). For an analysis of the Tech Training decision, see our
2017 survey, Thomas M. Byrne & Stacey McGavin Mohr, Class Actions, Eleventh Circuit
Survey, 69 Mercer L. Rev. 1065, 1078–79 (2018).
28 Oppenheim, 981 F.3d at 986–88.
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remand, the objection was upheld, and the Tech Training class was
decertified.29
But Medical & Chiropractic Clinic did more than thwart the
settlement. It also filed a separate action in state court, alleging claims
for breach of fiduciary duty against Oppenheim and his new law firm.30
The case was removed to federal district court, which granted summary
judgment for the defendants, finding that Oppenheim did not owe an
individual fiduciary duty to the class representative in the first case.
Alternatively, the court held that plaintiff had failed to show a breach of
any fiduciary duty that might exist or prove damages. The plaintiff
appealed.31
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit first noted that the parties agreed
that putative class counsel owed fiduciary duties to the class as a whole.32
But the plaintiff contended that Oppenheim owed a heightened fiduciary
duty to the putative class representative, distinct from the duty owed to
the class. The court rejected this argument.33 While noting that counsel
in class actions have different ethical duties to their clients than in
ordinary cases, one “cardinal rule” defines the scope of counsel’s ethical
obligations: “class counsel owes a duty to the class as a whole and not to
any individual member of the class.”34
The court also characterized the filing of the case in state court as a
thinly veiled attempt to make an end run around the ongoing proceedings
in the Tech Training case.35 As the court put it, “[t]here is only one
gatekeeper under Rule 23 and it was wholly inappropriate for [the
plaintiff] and its counsel to go to state court in an attempt to employ
another one.”36 The plaintiff “crossed a line” by attempting to litigate
their objections in another court.37
This second ground for the court’s holding could—and probably
should—have been the only basis for the court’s affirmance. The state
court action was plainly a collateral attack against aspiring class counsel
filed in the wrong court. It is a truism that class counsel owes fiduciary
duties to the entire class, but the court’s opinion only hinted at the
difficulties in application of that doctrine, such as individual pre-

Id. at 988.
Id.
31 Id. at 989.
32 Id. at 990.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 991.
35 Id. at 993.
36 Id.
37 Id.
29
30
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certification settlements, litigation of class representatives’ individual
claims along with claims of the class, varying strength of claims among
class members, and so on. The existence of a fiduciary duty to all class
members may not be in controversy, but the exercise of those duties
presents many difficult problems. Oppenheim may end up being cited,
likely unhelpfully, by both sides in future controversies where the scope
of class counsel’s obligations are genuinely in issue.
C. Release of Claims and Res Judicata: TVPX v. Genworth
The court probed the limitations of a class-action release in TVPX
ARS, Inc. v. Genworth Life & Annuity Ins. Co.38 Virtually every class
action settlement includes a broad release of claims by the class
members, which is almost always broader in stated scope than the mere
res judicata effect of the judgment entered when the settlement is
approved by the court. In TVPX, the plaintiff brought a punitive class
action in 2018 in the Eastern District of Virginia against Genworth Life
alleging that it violated the terms of its life insurance policies by
imposing inflated cost of insurance charges on its insureds. Genworth
responded by claiming that the case was precluded by a prior class action
settlement, approved in 2004 by the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Georgia, involving the same claims.39 So the case
turned on whether the 2018 claims were different from those settled in
2004. Genworth brought an action in the Middle District of Georgia
under the All Writs Act40 to enjoin the 2018 suit. The district court agreed
with Genworth and enjoined the 2018 action on res judicata grounds.41
On appeal, the court reversed the district court and remanded for
further factual development on whether the 2018 claims were truly
different.42 The court assumed that the defense of release and the defense
of res judicata were of the same scope and turned on whether the prior
release and the new complaint involved an identical factual predicate.43
The court rejected Genworth’s argument that the release defense was
broader in scope than res judicata, an argument that may have
warranted further development. In reversing, the court relied on the
plaintiff’s amended allegations that Genworth had engaged in new
impermissible practices since the 2004 settlement. This allegation, the
38 959 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2020). Judge Beverly Martin authored the opinion for the
court.
39 Id. at 1321.
40 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2021).
41 TVPX, 959 F.3d at 1324.
42 Id. at 1321.
43 Id. at 1328.
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court opined, was entitled to further factual development before
enjoining the 2018 action. At oral argument, Genworth’s counsel
conceded that nothing in the record established, one way or another,
whether its practices as to the relevant charges remained unchanged
since 2004.44 The court, however, rejected the plaintiff’s argument that
its new claims were carved out of the original 2004 settlement.45
II. STANDING OF CLASS REPRESENTATIVES AND CLASS MEMBERS
The court again addressed the question of Article III standing in
putative class actions, continuing to grapple with the Supreme Court’s
2016 decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins46 and related issues.
A. Statutory Injury: Muransky Redux
As discussed in our 2018 survey, a divided panel of the Eleventh
Circuit that year affirmed a district court’s order approving a class-action
settlement, rejecting arguments that the plaintiff lacked Article III
standing under Spokeo.47 The original panel opinion in that case,
Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc.,48 was vacated by a superseding
panel opinion,49 which in turn was vacated when the court voted to
rehear the case en banc. In 2020, the en banc court, in a similarly divided
opinion, reversed the district court’s order and directed that the case be
dismissed because the plaintiff lacked standing sufficient to establish
subject-matter jurisdiction.50
Muransky had filed a putative class action against Godiva alleging
that the chocolatier had willfully violated the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act (FACTA)51 by including on customers’ receipts more
than the last five digits of their credit card numbers. The inclusion of
additional digits, Muransky claimed, exposed class members “’to an

Id. at 1327–28.
Id. at 1329. Since the case returned to the district court in June 2020, the parties have
engaged in a series of scheduling and discovery disputes, starting with “dueling scheduling
proposals to resolve a very simple issue for which the Court of Appeals ordered remand,”
Order, Dkt. 280, No. 4:00-cv-00217-CDL (M.D. Ga. July 17, 2020), and including a motion
to compel, a hearing on that motion, and a motion to quash, see id. Dkts. 289, 298, 308.
46 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
47 Thomas M. Byrne & Stacey McGavin Mohr, Class Actions, Eleventh Circuit Survey,
70 MERCER L. REV. 895, 911–15 (2019).
48 905 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir. 2018).
49 922 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 2019).
50 Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 979 F.3d 917 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc). The
majority opinion for the en banc court was authored by Judge Britt Grant.
51 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(g).
44
45
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elevated risk of identity theft’.”52 The parties ultimately agreed to settle
the action on a classwide basis and moved for preliminary approval of the
proposed settlement.53 The settlement featured a $6.3 million settlement
fund, from which attorneys’ fees, costs, and class members would be
paid.54
Following the mailing of class notices, several class members objected
to the settlement on various grounds. At the fairness hearing, one of the
objectors raised a new objection: that Muransky lacked Article III
standing.55 The district court overruled the objections, including the one
about lack of standing, and approved the settlement.56
The objectors appealed, and a panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
An objector filed a petition for rehearing en banc, which the court
granted.57 A divided en banc court held that Muransky’s allegations were
insufficient to establish his standing to bring the FACTA claim.58
Judge Britt Grant, writing for the majority, framed the critical
question as a matter of separation of powers: “whether the judiciary must
assume that whenever Congress creates a legal entitlement, any
violation of that entitlement causes a concrete injury.”59 The majority’s
answer to that question was no. A plaintiff can plead (and then establish)
standing in two ways, the court explained: by showing that a statutory
violation directly caused a harm, tangible or otherwise, or by showing
that the violation “created a ‘risk of real harm.’”60 Spokeo establishes that
the risk of future harm must be “material,” while explaining that
“[w]hatever ‘material’ may mean, conceivable and trifling are not on the
list.”61 “A conclusory statement that a statutory violation caused an
injury is not enough,” the court continued, “so neither is a conclusory
statement that a statutory violation caused a risk of injury.”62
Muransky’s complaint (filed prior to Spokeo) had disclaimed any
recovery for “personal injury,” but he argued to the court that the
appearance of too many digits on his credit card receipt nevertheless
constituted a sufficiently concrete harm.63 First, Muransky argued that
Muransky, 979 F.3d at 922.
Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 922–23.
56 Id. at 923.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 936.
59 Id. at 923–24.
60 Id. at 926–27.
61 Id. at 927.
62 Id. at 928.
63 Id.
52
53
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Muransky had a “substantive right” to receive a properly truncated
receipt, such that his failure to receive such a receipt itself constituted
an injury; but “[n]othing in FACTA suggests some kind of intrinsic worth
in a compliant receipt,” the court said, “nor can we see any.”64 Second,
Muransky argued that the time spent safeguarding the receipt
constituted a sufficiently concrete injury. The court rejected that
argument, too, observing that Muransky’s complaint included no
allegation about affording the Godiva receipt any special treatment—and
that even if Muransky had made such an allegation, guarding against a
insufficiently concrete risk of harm could not create standing; “plaintiffs
‘cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on
themselves.’”65 Third, citing Spokeo, Muransky argued that the claim
bore “a ‘close relationship’ to a traditionally redressable harm,” namely
the tort of breach of confidence.66 The court disagreed, noting that breach
of confidence requires a confidential relationship and disclosure to a third
party, neither of which was present in Muransky’s case.67
The court also rejected Muransky’s argument that his complaint
sufficiently alleged a material risk of future harm.68 FACTA itself,
Muransky argued, demonstrates Congress’s determination that printing
more than the permitted number of digits on a receipt creates a real risk
of identity theft. The court rejected that argument, viewing it as an
invitation “to abandon our judicial role:”69 “Although the judgment of
Congress is an ‘instructive and important’ tool to identify Article III
injuries, we cannot accept Muransky’s argument that once Congress has
spoken, the courts have no further role.”70 Muransky’s conclusory
allegation that he faced an elevated risk of identity theft, the court added,
“is simply not enough.”71
Noting its conclusion that Muransky had failed sufficiently to allege
standing was in accord with decisions from the United States Court of

Id. at 929.
Id. at 931 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 416 (2013)).
66 Id. (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549).
67 Id. at 932.
68 Id. at 934.
69 Id. at 932.
70 Id. at 933 (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549).
71 Id.
64
65
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Appeals for the Second,72 Third,73 and Ninth74 Circuits, the court vacated
the district court’s order approving the settlement.75 The court also
directed that the case be dismissed without prejudice, noting that
Muransky had been on notice throughout the case that his standing was
in question, but never requested leave to amend his complaint.76
Three judges wrote dissenting opinions. Judge Charles Wilson
concluded that “Muransky plausibly alleged that Godiva’s FACTA
violation elevated his risk of identity theft the moment the receipt was
printed,” because “FACTA protects his concrete interest in using his
credit or debit card without incurring a heightened risk of identity
theft.”77 Judge Wilson added that the majority’s contrary conclusion “all
but ensures that consumers in the Eleventh Circuit must now allege,
support, and prove that they suffered actual identity theft (or at least
soon will) because of a defendant’s FACTA violation in order to avail
themselves of the law’s protections.”78
Judge Martin, who had written the panel opinion in the case, wrote
that the majority’s opinion “ignore[d] the judgment of Congress,” which,
in her view “established the point of intolerable risk at more than the last
five digits being displayed on a receipt.”79 “[T]here is nothing
incompatible with the court satisfying itself of an injury’s concreteness,
and considering the judgment of Congress at the same time,” the judge
added.80 Judge Martin also disagreed with the majority as to the
relevance of the tort of breach of confidence, finding sufficient
commonality between that tort and Muransky’s claim to confirm his
standing.81
Judge Adalberto Jordan joined these two dissents but also wrote
separately, objecting to the majority’s dismissal of the action on the
ground that it unfairly deprived Muransky of an opportunity to amend

Katz v. Donna Karan Co., 872 F.3d 114, 117, 121 (2d Cir. 2017).
Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 106, 119 (3d Cir. 2019). For another recent
Third Circuit decision finding no standing to assert a statutory violation, see also Thorne v.
Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack Inc., 980 F.3d 879 (3d Cir. 2020) (claimed violation of National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966).
74 Noble v. Nevada Checker Cab Corp., 726 F. App’x 582, 583–84 (9th Cir. 2018). For
another recent Ninth Circuit decision finding no standing under Spokeo, see McGee v. S-L
Snacks Nat’l, 982 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2020).
75 Muransky, 979 F.3d at 936.
76 Id. at 935–36.
77 Id. at 937–38 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 937.
79 Id. at 947 (Martin, J., dissenting).
80 Id. at 952 (Martin, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 955–56 (Martin, J., dissenting).
72
73
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his complaint.82 Judge Jordan also expressed the view that standing
should be viewed in the context of a distinction between public and
private rights. English and American courts, he wrote, historically
“heard suits involving private rights,” like the FACTA-created rights at
issue, “regardless of whether the plaintiff suffered actual damage.”83
Aside from vacating the panel opinion that found standing, the
ultimate impact of Muransky may be somewhat limited. The complaint
in the case relied on statutory violations and indeed expressly disclaimed
any attempt to recover for “personal injury.” After Spokeo, plaintiffs’
lawyers have attempted to include allegations of particularized injury
and avoid framing claims as pure statutory violations.
B. Statutory Violations and Particularized Injury: Trichell v. Midland
Funding
Two such attempts were rejected by the Eleventh Circuit in Trichell v.
Midland Credit Management, Inc.84 The appeal in Trichell stemmed from
two separate lawsuits—one filed in Alabama and one in Georgia—
claiming violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).85
In each case, the plaintiff’s complaint alleged that he (and a class of
similarly situated individuals) received debt-collection letters that were
misleading, although neither alleged that he was actually misled by the
letter. And, in each case, the district court dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a claim under the FDCPA, concluding the letters were not
misleading, and the plaintiff appealed.86
Although no party raised standing in their appellate briefs, the
Eleventh Circuit sua sponte ordered the parties to address the issue at
argument.87 The court ultimately concluded that neither complaint
sufficiently alleged Article III standing and remanded the cases to be
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.88
The alleged FDCPA violations arose from collection letters related to
credit-card debt on which each plaintiff had defaulted several years
prior—that is, so long before that any claims on the debt would be time-

Id. at 957 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 971 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
84 964 F.3d 990 (11th Cir. 2020). The court’s opinion was authored by Judge Gregory G.
Katsas of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, sitting by designation,
and joined by Judge Bill Pryor. Judge Beverly Martin wrote a separate opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part.
85 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2021).
86 Trichell, 964 F.3d at 995.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1005.
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barred under applicable state law. Each letter offered the recipient
seemingly attractive repayment options “designed to save you money”
and urged the recipient to “[a]ct now to maximize your savings and put
this debt behind you.”89 As to the statute-of-limitations issue, each letter
contained a disclaimer stating, “[t]he law limits how long you can be sued
on a debt and how long a debt can appear on your credit report. Due to
the age of this debt, we will not sue you for it or report payment or nonpayment of it to a credit bureau.”90
One plaintiff, Mr. Trichell, alleged that the collection letters were
misleading and unfair in falsely suggesting that he could be sued or that
the debt could be reported to credit-rating agencies. The other plaintiff,
Mr. Cooper, described the problem slightly differently, alleging that the
letter was misleading by failing to warn recipients that making a partial
payment on the debt could constitute a new promise to pay and actually
give rise to a new limitations period.91
After a thorough review of Spokeo, Supreme Court and Eleventh
Circuit standing precedent, and Congress’s intent as set forth in the
FDCPA, the court concluded that neither of plaintiff’s allegations set
forth a particularized injury sufficient for Article III standing.92
Specifically, the court pointed to the fact that neither plaintiff alleged
reliance on any misrepresentation, much less any damage thereby.93 The
court also rejected the plaintiffs’ assertions of standing based on risk and
informational injuries.94 Overall, the court concluded, neither plaintiff
“suffered an injury in fact when they received allegedly misleading
communications that did not mislead them.”95
Judge Martin (who had authored the then-vacated panel opinion
finding standing in Muransky) dissented as to one of the plaintiffs.96
Judge Martin agreed with the majority that plaintiff Trichell failed to
allege any particularized harm but would have held that plaintiff Cooper
had done so by claiming that, “if he had responded to the letter by making
a payment on the time-barred debt, he would have unwittingly restarted
the statute of limitations.”97
Id. at 995.
Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 1005.
93 Id. at 998–1000.
94 Id. at 1000–05.
95 Id. at 1005.
96 Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
97 Id. A few weeks after Trichell was decided, Judge Martin joined in a per curiam
opinion that similarly concluded a putative class representative lacked standing to pursue
FDCPA claims. Cooper v. Atl. Credit & Fin. Inc., 822 F. App’x 951 (11th Cir. 2020). The
89
90
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C. Standing of Unnamed Class Members: Cordoba
Courts coping with overbroad class definitions that include uninjured
class members have produced a cacophony of opinions. A first question
often addressed in these opinions is whether the problem is one of Article
III standing or of meeting Rule 23’s class certification requirements, or
both. The Supreme Court faced the issue in TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez,98 in which it granted certiorari on the question of “[w]hether
either Article III or Rule 23 permits a damages class action where the
vast majority of the class suffered no actual injury, let alone an injury
anything like what the class representative suffered.”99
In reserving the Rule 23 question, the Supreme Court cited the
Eleventh Circuit’s late 2019 decision in Cordoba v. DIRECTV, LLC,100
which held that standing of absent class members—not just the class
representative—must be examined at the certification stage as part of
the predominance requirement for certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class.101
Cordoba was a TCPA action brought by a plaintiff claiming that he had
received telemarketing calls from DirecTV that violated the statute.
Specifically, the allegation was that DirecTV had failed to maintain a list
of individuals who asked not to receive calls—a so-called internal do-notcall list required by an FCC implementing regulation.102 Cordoba alleged
that DirecTV failed to maintain this list and continued to call individuals
who asked not to be contacted.103 After the district court certified a class
of all persons who received more than one telemarketing call on behalf of
DirecTV due to its failure to maintain an internal do-not-call list, the
Eleventh Circuit granted DirecTV’s petition for interlocutory review

court in Cooper concluded that the injuries alleged there were “just as inchoate, if not more
so” than those in Trichell:
[Plaintiff] does not allege that, without the purportedly confusing language in
the second letter, she would have disputed the debt or sought validation of the
debt within the thirty-day validation period, that she had any doubt regarding
the validity of the debt, or that she would have accepted one of the payment
options in the second letter. Nor does she allege that she suffered any harm
beyond the alleged statutory violations, or that Atlantic and Midland ever made
any further attempts to collect the debt at issue . . . .
Id. at 954–55.
98 141 S.Ct. 2190 (2021).
99 Petition for Cert. at i, Transkim, 141 S.Ct. 2190 (No. 20-297), 2020 WL 7366280.
100 942 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2019). Judge Stanley Marcus authored the opinion for the
court.
101 141 S.Ct. at 2207 n.4.
102 Id. at 1264–65.
103 Id. at 1266.
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under Rule 23(f).104 But the Court decided the case on Article III grounds
and reserved the Rule 23 question.105
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated class certification, concluding
that unnamed members of the would-be class who did not ask DirecTV
to stop calling them—and so would not have been on the list even if it
had been maintained—were not injured by the failure to maintain the
list.106 This was so even though the class representative had Article III
standing. As the court put it, “the fact that many, perhaps most, members
of the class may lack standing is extremely important to the class
certification decision.”107
In the case of a Rule 23(b)(3) class, the individualized inquiry
necessary to determine whether each class member asked the
telemarketer to stop calling would preclude a finding of the requisite
predominance of common issues over individual issues.108 “The essential
point . . . is that at some time in the course of the litigation the district
court will have to determine whether each of the absent class members
has standing before they could be granted any relief. That is an
individualized issue . . . .”109 Would-be class members who did not ask to
be put on the no-call list lack standing due to their failure to establish
that their injuries are traceable to the challenged action of the defendant.
Even though the receipt of a single phone call was enough to establish
the requisite injury, according to the court, it was not enough to establish
traceability.110 The court distinguished its recent holding in Salcedo v.
Hanna,111 in which a single unlawful text message was held to be
insufficient to establish injury, based on the relatively greater
intrusiveness of a phone call.112
Wherever it appears that a large portion of a proposed class may lack
standing, the court held that a district court must consider, before
certification under Rule 23(b)(3), whether individualized issues of
standing will predominate over common issues.113 The mere possibility
of standing problems for a few class members, the court noted, would not
necessarily preclude class certification; the court could decide to deal

Id. at 1266–67.
141 S.Ct at 2214.
106 Id. at 1277.
107 Id. at 1264.
108 Id. at 1274–75.
109 Id. at 1274.
110 Id. at 1270–72.
111 936 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2019).
112 Id. at 1165.
113 Cordoba, 942 F.3d at 1267–68.
104
105
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with that problem later on in the proceeding, before it awarded any
relief.114 “But there is a meaningful difference between a class with a few
members who might not have suffered an injury traceable to the
defendants and a class with potentially many more, even a majority, who
do not have Article III standing.”115 The court noted that a blanket rule
precluding class certification if any individuals in the class lack standing
would likely run the risk of promoting so-called “fail-safe” classes, in
which membership is defined on the basis of having a meritorious
claim.116 This practice, universally recognized as improper, is no remedy
for an overbroad class.
Since there was nothing in the record to allow determination on appeal
of the makeup of the internal do-not-call list class, the court remanded
the case for further proceedings.117 Cordoba seems likely to align with
the Supreme Court’s upcoming decision in TransUnion, which should
provide a new starting line for class-action standing controversies.
TransUnion may do for the underdeveloped Rule 23 typicality
requirement what Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes118 did for the rule’s
commonality requirement—mandate a new, invigorated inquiry.
III. CAFA JURISDICTION
The Eleventh Circuit also opined on one of the less-commonly invoked
provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act119 (CAFA), clarified the scope
of the “local event exception” to federal-court jurisdiction over “mass
actions” in Spencer v. Specialty Foundry Products Inc.120 The court
interpreted the exception narrowly—that is in favor of federal
jurisdiction—concluding that claims by former foundry employees
against manufacturers and distributors of products used at the foundry
were not within the exception.121
The plaintiffs were 230 former workers at a now-closed Alabama
foundry. They worked in different jobs at different times, but all claimed
harm from exposure to hazardous chemicals during their employment.
The defendants were unrelated companies that manufactured (and in
some cases distributed) chemical products used at the foundry, including
Id. at 1277.
Id.
116 Id. at 1276–77.
117 Id. at 1277.
118 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
119 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
120 953 F.3d 735 (11th Cir. 2020).
121 Id. at 739–40.
114
115
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sands, resins, gases, and other substances of various formulations.122 The
plaintiffs’ complaint, originally filed in state court, included several
claims arising from the allegation that the “normal and foreseeable use
of the [d]efendants’ products at the foundry [caused] the formation and
release of hazardous and carcinogenic chemical substances,” which
harmed them.123
One defendant removed the case to federal court under CAFA’s “mass
action” provision, which provides, generally, that an action brought by
100 or more plaintiffs collectively seeking over $5,000,000 may be
considered a class action under CAFA.124 The plaintiffs moved to remand,
on two bases. First, they argued that the case is not a “mass action”
removable under CAFA because it falls under the so-called “local event
exception” to the definition of “mass action,” in that “all of the
claims . . . arise from an event or occurrence in the State in which the
action was filed” and the event or occurrence “allegedly resulted in
injuries in that State or in States contiguous to that State.”125 Second,
the plaintiffs argued that the case should be remanded under CAFA’s
“local controversy exception,” which requires remand if two-thirds of the
plaintiffs and a significant defendant are citizens of the state in which
the case was filed, and the principal injury or related conduct occurred
there.126 The district court granted the motion to remand based on the
local event exception, and therefore did not consider the local controversy
exception.127
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the remand order.128 The critical
question was whether the plaintiffs’ allegations constituted “an event or
occurrence” within the meaning of the local event exception.129 The
defendants argued that the exception applies only to a single, discrete
event, while the plaintiffs argued it also applies to a continuing set of
“truly local” circumstances.130 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that “‘an
event or occurrence’ refers to a series of connected, harm-causing
incidents that culminate in one event or occurrence giving rise to
plaintiffs’ claims.”131 The court found support for this conclusion in the

Id. at 737–38.
Id. at 738.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 744.
129 Id. at 739.
130 Id. at 739–40.
131 Id. at 740.
122
123
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dictionary definitions of “event” and “occurrence,” and noted that while
the article “an” indicates singularity, a connected series can constitute a
single item.132
The Eleventh Circuit’s construction of the phrase is similar to those of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third and Fifth Circuits, in
Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Group133 and Rainbow Gun Club, Inc.
v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C.134 respectively, but differs from the Ninth
Circuit’s in Allen v. Boeing Co.,135 under which the phrase an “event or
occurrence” refers to a “single happening.”136
Applying its definition to the foundry employees’ allegations, the
Eleventh Circuit found the allegations insufficient to fall within the
exception for three reasons. First, the defendants manufactured (or
distributed) different products, used in different ways, alleged to have
caused different types of harm.137 Second, the plaintiffs failed to allege a
single “culminating event,” as opposed to a “string of events over time
and later-resulting harm.”138 Third, the plaintiffs’ allegations fell short of
claiming that the defendants somehow came together to cause a single
“event or occurrence. The foundry was open for decades, but the
[p]laintiffs do not say when the [d]efendants committed the alleged torts
or how and when the [p]laintiffs were harmed.”139
IV. ENGLE PROGENY
The Eleventh Circuit’s November 2020 opinion in Harris v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co.140 begins with the auspicious observation that this
Engle case is “one of the last that we’re likely to see.”141 Correct or not,
the comment evokes the long history in the Eleventh Circuit of the
progeny of the Florida Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Engle v.
Liggett Group.142 As the Eleventh Circuit explains,

132 Id. at 740–41. Here, the court employed a baseball analogy: an inning, a baseball
game, and the World Series each can be described as “an event,” even though there are
multiple innings in a game and multiple games in the Series. Id.
133 719 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2013).
134 760 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2014).
135 784 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 2015).
136 Id. at 629.
137 Spencer, 953 F.3d at 743.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 744.
140 981 F.3d 880 (11th Cir. 2020).
141 Id. at 882.
142 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006).
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“Engle” refers to an entire generation’s worth of litigation in which
Florida-resident smokers (or, as in this case, their personal
representatives) have sought recovery from tobacco companies for
cigarette-related injuries . . . . [F]or present purposes, suffice it to say
that the litigation has unfolded in three “Phases”: In Phase I, a statecourt jury determined, with respect to an entire class of smokers, that
in manufacturing and marketing nicotine-based cigarettes the tobacco
companies engaged in tortious misconduct. In Phase II, the same jury
found that the companies’ misconduct injured each of three
representative plaintiffs and awarded them damages. Then, in Phase
III—following decertification of the class—thousands of individual
smokers brought suits for their own injuries.143

The court dealt with a number of issues arising from Phase III Engle
cases this year, including the definition for class membership (and
entitlement to the preclusive effect of the jury’s Phase I findings),
excessiveness of damages awards, and the severability of punitive
damages from liability.
A. Class Membership and Preclusion: Harris
In Harris, the court considered whether Gerald Harris was a member
of the Engle class, as argued by his wife as personal representative, such
that the Phase I Engle jury’s findings of tortious misconduct by the
tobacco companies would have preclusive effect.144 A plaintiff is
considered a class member if he can show that he suffered from a medical
condition that was both (1) caused by cigarette addiction and (2)
manifested on or before November 21, 1996.145
Mr. Harris had smoked most of his life and suffered from heart
disease, oral cavity cancer, vocal cord cancer, and lung cancer.146
Although the jury found that Mr. Harris’s heart disease was not caused
by cigarette addiction and that his oral cavity cancer did not manifest
itself by the cut-off date, the district court nevertheless proceeded as
though Mr. Harris was a class member, allowing the jury to conclude that
the defendants’ conduct injured Mr. Harris and that he was entitled to
damages. The defendants moved for judgment in accordance with the
jury’s verdict, arguing that because the jury found no medical condition
143 Harris, 981 F.3d at 882. We have analyzed the court’s Engle progeny opinions in prior
years’ surveys. See Byrne & Mohr, supra note 47, at 917–21; Byrne & Mohr, supra note 27,
at 1075–78; Thomas M. Byrne & Stacey McGavin Mohr, Class Actions, Eleventh Circuit
Survey, 63 MERCER L. REV. 1183, 1199 n.139 (2012); Thomas M. Byrne & Stacey McGavin
Mohr, Class Actions, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 62 MERCER L. REV 1107, 1122–24 (2011).
144 Harris, 981 F.3d at 883.
145 Id. at 883–84.
146 Id. at 884.
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that satisfied both of the prongs to establish class membership, Mr.
Harris was not a class member, and Mrs. Harris was not entitled to a
finding that the defendants engaged in tortious conduct. And, because
Mrs. Harris had not proven that the defendants behaved tortiously, the
defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The district
court denied the motion as well as the defendants’ renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law and motion for new trial.147
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the motion
for judgment in accordance with the verdict.148 Because the jury did not
find that Mr. Harris had a medical condition that both was caused by his
cigarette addiction and manifested on or before November 21, 1996, he
was not a member of the Engle class.149
The district court’s conclusion that Mr. Harris qualified as a class
member had relied on an improper reading of the Florida Supreme
Court’s discussion of one of the named Engle plaintiffs, Angie Della
Vecchia, to infer that the Engle class included anyone who had at least
one medical condition that was caused by cigarette addiction and at least
one condition that manifested on or before the cut-off date.150 But the
Eleventh Circuit pointed out that the Engle jury found that Ms. Della
Vecchia’s lung cancer was caused by cigarette addiction and that the lung
cancer also manifested itself before the cut-off date.151 Further, the
Florida Supreme Court stated in its opinion that Ms. Della Vecchia’s
COPD was “tobacco related” (which the Eleventh Circuit interpreted to
mean it was caused by cigarettes) and manifested itself prior to the cutoff date.152 The Florida Supreme Court’s opinion therefore demonstrated
that, although Ms. Della Vecchia had two different conditions, each one
independently satisfied both requirements for class membership.153
The court also pointed out that the Florida Supreme Court’s discussion
of Ms. Della Vecchia’s class membership status was dicta because the
issue was not raised or litigated, and Ms. Vecchia was a named
plaintiff.154 Finally, to uphold the district court’s reading of Engle would
produce bizarre results: a plaintiff could be considered a class member so

Id. at 884–85.
Id. at 889.
149 Id. at 886.
150 Id. at 886–87.
151 Id. at 887.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 888.
147
148
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long as the plaintiff had some qualifying medical condition by the cut-off
date even if it was wholly unrelated to smoking.155
B. Damages Awards: Kerrivan
Earlier in 2020, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed denial of motions for
judgment as a matter of law against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. and Philip
Morris USA Inc. in Kerrivan v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,156 upholding
multi-million dollar jury verdicts against the defendants.
The plaintiff, Mr. Kerrivan, became an addicted serial smoker at an
early age, suffered increasingly serious medical diagnoses as a result,
and made repeated unsuccessful attempts to quit. The plaintiff
eventually quit smoking but has required an oxygen tank to assist his
breathing ever since.157 After the jury awarded $15.8 million in
compensatory damages and $25.3 million in punitive damages on various
fraud and conspiracy claims, the tobacco companies renewed motions for
judgment as a matter of law and filed a motion for new trial or remittitur.
Both companies argued that the compensatory damages award was
excessive, that the punitive damages award was unconstitutional, and
that the evidence of reliance was insufficient to support the fraudulent
concealment and conspiracy claims. The motions were denied, and the
defendants appealed.158
As to compensatory damages, the focus of the appeal was whether the
award was excessive in that it resulted from passion. The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that it was not, unfazed by the fact that the award was
higher than those in other Engle-progeny cases, which the court said
were “simply different.”159 Nor was the award excessive because it was
more than what the plaintiff’s counsel requested from the jury.160
The Eleventh Circuit also upheld the punitive damages award as
constitutional under State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell.161 The tobacco companies’ conduct was particularly
reprehensible: they repeatedly concealed evidence that cigarettes
containing nicotine were addictive and caused serious health conditions,
and they developed filtered and light products to deceive smokers into
believing that these products were safer.162 These findings demonstrated
Id.
953 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir. 2020).
157 Id. at 1201–02.
158 Id. at 1203–04.
159 Id. at 1206–07.
160 Id. at 1208.
161 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
162 Kerrivan, 953 F.3d at 1208–09.
155
156
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a “high level of indifference and reckless disregard for the health and
safety of smokers.”163 While the defendants debated whether the correct
ratio of punitive-to-compensatory damages was 2:1 or 1.6:1, depending
on whether the award should be examined with regard to the defendants
individually or collectively, the court noted that the Supreme Court has
held that single-digit multipliers are likely to comport with due process,
and this was a very low single-digit multiplier either way.164
On the question of whether Kerrivan presented sufficient evidence of
fraudulent concealment under Florida law, the court found evidence of
the tobacco industry’s sustained and pervasive disinformation campaign.
Kerrivan had presented evidence about advertisements influencing his
own decision to switch to filtered cigarettes to cut out the nicotine, the
very claim the industry had made in marketing filtered cigarettes.165
Florida law did not require evidence of reliance on a particular statement
of the defendant.166
C. New Trial for Punitive Damages: Sowers
The jury’s damage award also was at the heart of the appeal in Sowers
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,167 the primary issue in the case being
whether the plaintiff would have to risk a multi-million dollar award of
compensatory damages in order to seek punitive damages in a new trial.
Like many Engle cases, Sowers involved claims against a cigarette
manufacturer brought by the widow (and personal representative) of a
decades-long smoker who died of lung cancer. A jury found the
manufacturer, R.J. Reynolds, liable for Mr. Sowers’s death and awarded
compensatory damages, resulting in in a judgment of $2.125 million.168
The jury was not presented with the question of punitive damages,
because the district court had ruled, based on a decision by a Florida
intermediate appellate court, that Ms. Sowers could not seek such
damages on her claims for negligence and strict liability—the only claims
on which she prevailed at trial.169
R.J. Reynolds appealed seeking a new trial, and Ms. Sowers crossappealed.170 The Eleventh Circuit rejected R.J. Reynolds’s grounds for
Id. at 1209.
Id. at 1210.
165 Id. at 1211.
166 Id. at 1212.
167 975 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 2020).
168 Id. at 1117.
169 Id. at 1117 (citing Soffer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 160 So. 3d 456, 460–61 (Fla.
1st DCA 2012)).
170 Sowers, 975 F.3d at 1117.
163
164
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appeal but granted Ms. Sowers’s request for a new trial on the issue of
punitive damages.171 Ms. Sowers’s right to pursue punitive damages was
dictated by an intervening decision from the Florida Supreme Court,
which clarified that Engle plaintiffs could pursue punitive damages on
“all claims properly raised in their subsequent individual actions.”172 R.J.
Reynolds therefore did not contest the request for a new trial on punitive
damages, but it did contest the scope of that trial—and, consequently,
when it would have to pay the $2.125 million in compensatory
damages.173
Specifically, R.J. Reynolds contended that any new trial on punitive
damages also would have to include the liability issue, which, as the
Eleventh Circuit explained, “would put at risk all of the compensatory
damages [Ms. Sowers] was awarded in the first trial.”174 The court
disagreed, analyzing the issue under the Reexamination Clause of the
Seventh Amendment175 and concluding that “the punitive damages
issues to be tried before a new jury on remand are ‘so distinct and
separable’ from the issues decided by the first jury ‘that a trial of
[punitive damages] alone may be had without injustice.’”176
Prior to its thorough discussion of the Reexamination Clause, however,
the Eleventh Circuit made clear the stakes involved in R.J. Reynolds’s
insistence on Ms. Sowers having to retry her liability case along with
punitive damages:
Actually, what the company wants to do is pressure the elderly widow,
whose husband its products killed, out of exercising her right to seek
punitive damages from it for that. The amount of pressure that
strategy employs is shown by the fact that Mrs. Sowers has stated
through her attorneys that if she is forced to retry the liability and
compensatory damages issues as the cost of seeking punitive damages,
she will forsake her right to seek them.177

Id.
Soffer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 187 So. 3d 1219, 1221 (Fla. 2016).
173 Sowers, 975 F.3d at 1126.
174 Id. at 1117.
175 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Reexamination Clause is the second clause of the
Seventh Amendment, which states,
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.
Id.
176 Sowers, 975 F.3d at 1133 (quoting Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283
U.S. 494, 500 (1931)).
177 Sowers, 975 F.3d at 1127.
171
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Not only did the Eleventh Circuit not allow “R.J. Reynolds to force that
difficult choice on” Ms. Sowers,178 but the court also took the additional
step of specifically directing the district court “to order execution on the
compensatory damages part of the judgment immediately after issuance
of the mandate in this appeal.”179

178
179

Id.
Id. at 1138.

